> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://whalehub-1.gitbook.io/whalehub/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://whalehub-1.gitbook.io/whalehub/tokenomics/bribes-harvesting.md).

# Bribes Harvesting Module

The **Bribes Harvesting Module** is Whalehub's current reward engine — the source of the BLUB that stakers earn. It replaces the legacy [v1 POL pool-farming flow](/whalehub/tokenomics/reward-distribution.md#v1-pol-pool-farming-legacy) and is designed around one principle: **always harvest the highest-yielding bribes available, and pass that yield to stakers as BLUB.**

## What is a bribe?

Aquarius lets AQUA holders lock AQUA into **ICE** (non-transferable voting power) and vote for the Stellar markets they want to receive AQUA liquidity emissions. To attract votes, anyone can attach a **bribe** to a market — an on-chain incentive paid out to that market's voters, pro-rata to their share of the votes. Voting earns the bribe **without putting any funds at risk** in an AMM or order book.

Whalehub holds a large ICE position, so it earns bribes simply by voting — and those bribes become staker rewards.

## How stakers get BLUB

```mermaid
flowchart LR
    A[Whalehub ICE<br/>voting power] -->|vote highest-yield market| B[Aquarius bribes<br/>~50-60K AQUA/day]
    B -->|30%| C[Treasury]
    B -->|70%| D[Swap AQUA → BLUB<br/>on Aquarius router]
    D --> E[add_rewards to<br/>staking contract]
    E --> F[Stakers earn BLUB<br/>Synthetix pro-rata]
```

1. **Vote** — Whalehub casts its ICE (upvoteICE) on the market chosen by the optimizer (below).
2. **Collect** — bribes arrive in the manager wallet as plain AQUA payments, roughly daily.
3. **Split** — 30% of the AQUA is sent to the protocol treasury.
4. **Convert** — the remaining 70% is swapped AQUA → BLUB on the Aquarius router (chunked to limit price impact). BLUB is **bought on the open market, never minted** — so rewards are non-dilutive.
5. **Distribute** — that BLUB is added to the staking contract and accrues to every staker pro-rata via the [Synthetix reward model](/whalehub/tokenomics/reward-distribution.md#the-math).

## Yield optimization — voting for the best yield

A bribe's headline size is **not** what determines your income. You earn your **share** of a market's bribe, and that share depends on how much voting power is already there:

```
your daily income(market)  =  bribe(market) × W / (existing_votes + W)
```

where `W` is Whalehub's voting power. A huge bribe on a heavily-voted market can pay less than a modest bribe on a lightly-voted one — and vice-versa. The module therefore evaluates **every active bribe** and picks the market with the highest expected income for our `W`, not the biggest sticker number.

**Data sources (live, public Aquarius APIs):**

| Input                             | Endpoint                                                      |
| --------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Bribes per market (daily AQUA)    | `bribes-api.aqua.network/api/bribes/`                         |
| Votes per market (`upvote_value`) | `voting-tracker.aqua.network/api/voting-snapshot/top-volume/` |
| Market → pair mapping             | `marketkeys-tracker.aqua.network/api/market-keys/`            |

**Tooling:** `scripts/bribe_vote_optimizer.py` joins these three feeds, backs out Whalehub's effective voting power from its current position, and ranks every bribed market by the expected daily income above. Re-run it each voting epoch (bribes reset weekly):

```
python3 scripts/bribe_vote_optimizer.py <current_daily_income_aqua>
```

The optimizer accounts for **dilution** — moving votes onto a market lowers everyone's share, so it reports the realistic post-move income, not a naive projection. Small markets with a high bribe-per-vote but a tiny total pool are correctly down-ranked, because Whalehub's own votes would dominate them and cap the absolute payout.

## Why this beats v1

* **Resilient:** not tied to any single pool's whitelist status — if one market's bribes dry up, the optimizer rotates to the next-best.
* **Higher yield:** votes are continuously steered to the most profitable market each epoch.
* **No new risk:** voting earns bribes without depositing into AMMs; BLUB is bought, not minted.

## Notes & cadence

* Bribes are distributed by Aquarius over weekly epochs and arrive \~daily. Voting has a minimum lock period, so Whalehub does not chase one-off spikes — it targets durable, repeating bribes.
* Backend service: `BribeRewardService` (collection, 30/70 split, swap, `add_rewards`). Vote targeting is driven by the optimizer's output.